Perhaps more so than other literary forms, satire depends on an external referent: the more ignoble it determines the object of its ridicule to be, the more derisive is the invective it unleashes. Fredric Bogel has recently compared the signature gesture of the satirist to that of an offi cer or a judge: "Th e act of exclusion or expulsion requires a fi rm line to be drawn between inside and outside, expeller and expelled . . . as one might argue that the point of ar resting and incarcerating criminals is not only to restrain them but also to clarify the line between legal and illegal behavior" (Bogel 68). Th e satirist as adjudicator or incarcerator would, indeed, be an apt characterization of the Viennese satirist Karl Kraus (1876Kraus ( -1934, for whom satire was less an individual genre than a trans-generic mode of ex pression informing the various literary forms that make up hi s oeuvre: the aphor ism, the gloss, the essa y, and the dr ama. Th e question thus oЀ en raised when addressing his writings is from what source or sources does Kraus draw his unwavering authorial voice? Or, to paraphrase Walter Benjamin, an early reader of Kraus: on what fi rm ground does the satirist stand when passing his judgments?
the natural world possesses no language of its own; that if language were bestowed upon it, nature would immediately begin to lament; and that bestowing language upon nature is not the same as making nature speak.
What I suggest is that despite the pretense of metaphysics, which would normally preclude these judgments from containing critical or analytical potential, the distinction Benjamin is trying to make between these two modalities of communicating the language of nature is that between invoking nature's non-anthropocentric, transcendental language of mour ning and making nature speak with a language that is the mere refl ection of reifi ed human subjectivity. To be sure: by relying on Benjamin's hermeneutic framework, I am not suggesting that Kraus is somehow able to commune in an unmediated manner with the natural world. Rather, Benjamin's distinction posits the theoretical possibility that there are two opposing ways to impart the language of nature, the former being preferable to the latt er because it liberates rather than suppresses. Kraus's various att empts to invoke nature's language of mourning illuminate, I argue, the critical stakes involved in Benjamin's distinction. As I will later show, Kraus's methods also speak to other theoretical discourses on the relationships linking nature, language, and satire.
Kraus scholars have agreed that nature plays an important role in Kraus's thought. E dward T imms, for ex ample, h as ar gued th at the rhet oric of a prelapsarian sta te of n ature per meates Kr aus's World War I w ritings ( Karl Kraus: Ap ocalyptic Sa tirist 2 44-56). Referring mor e spe cifi cally t o Kr aus's relationship t o la w, N ike W agner h as w ritt en, "D abei w ird klar , daß der Kraussche Be griἀ des R echts immer einen Bezug zum N aturrecht b zw. zu einer natürlichen Gerechtigkeit hat" (106). And Kurt Krolop takes this notion further when he argues that Kraus's satire is saturated with the "Pathos eines Naturanwalts" (19) . What I view as the collective shortcoming of these claims, however, is that they c onverge and t erminate at the identi fi cation of something like a fi xed cultural or political di sposition in Kraus. 5 Even if unintentionally, these claims p ave the wa y for mi sleading r eproaches le veled against Kraus: that, for example, his idealization of nature bordered on nature worship or that nature is, for him, always a point or place of temporal return. By contrast, this article shows how Kraus's variegated invocations of n ature constitute a structural component of his literary apparatus and do not refl ect deep-seated, infl exible, or reactionary convictions.
Th at nature i s not one but m any things in Kr aus complicates the m atter and makes it interesting; however, that there are enough shared qualities even within the distinct iterations of the term is what enables me to subsume it under the same category. In what follows, I fi rst turn to Kraus's essay "Apokalypse (Off ener Brief an das Publikum) " (1908) before addressing a polemical exchange between Kraus and a for mer Fackel subscriber regarding a missive writt en by Rosa Luxemburg. I conclude the section on Kraus's defense of the natural world by analyzing a few sc enes from his satirical tragedy Die letzten Tage der Menschheit (1915 Menschheit ( -1922 . In the next section, I discuss to what extent nature shiЀ s in signifi cation for Kraus when it is transposed onto the aesthetic sphere, specifi cally as di sclosed in Kr aus's literary polemic a gainst Heinrich Heine (1910) . W hat I w ill ultim ately show i s th at at var ious moments and through this peculiar form of quotation, Kraus reveals himself to be not just an oppositional satirist lashing out a gainst moder nity but a mor e nuanced critic of the relationship between the human and the nonhuman world, both in the ecological as well as the aesthetic sense.
II. Trees, Leaves, and Feathers
Nur ein gerissener Wilddieb kann ein sehr guter Waldhüter sein.
Golo Mann, on Kraus, cited in Pfäffl in 182 Read metaphorically, Mann suggests that only the "poacher" Kraus, who understands the language of jour nalism all too well, is capable of defeating his opponents at their own game. But Mann's words can also be taken more literally: Forests contain trees, out of which newspaper is made, on which words are imprinted. For Mann, then, Kraus steals the words of others only in order to protect the forest of language from intruders and other sources of destruction, namely journalists. Language is, as it w ere, Kraus's most pr ized natural resource; he once described it as "die einzige Chimäre, deren TrugkraЀ ohne Ende ist" (F 885, 4, 1 932) . When one thus considers that Kraus views the overproduction of newspapers to be a fl agrant abuse of the natural world, his identifi cation with the forest ranger appears uncannily literal. 6 Kraus's "Apokalypse," which appeared in the O ctober 1908 issue of Die Fackel, perhaps best i llustrates Mann's claim above. In this jeremiad against both the exc esses of the V iennese press as w ell as the public dem and th at Kraus deliv er an " opinion" on i ssues of soc ial impor t, Kr aus di stinguishes himself unconditionally from the journalist, the politician, and the a esthete, all of w hom he hold s to be one and the same and ther efore equally respon-sible for bringing Vienna one step closer to its r uination. As an augur of the approaching catastrophe, however, Kraus imputes to the press what appears to be environmental negligence:
Wo einst r agende B äume den D ank der E rde zum H immel hoben, tür men sich S onntagsaufl agen. H at m an nicht a usgerechnet, daß eine gr oße Zeitung für eine einzig e Ausgabe eine Papiermasse braucht, zu deren Herstellung zehntausend Bäume von zwanzig Meter Höhe gefällt werden mußten? Es i st schneller nachgedruckt als nachgeforstet. Wehe, wenn es so w eit kommt, daß die B äume bloß täglich zweimal, aber sonst keine Blätt er tragen! (F 261, 3, 1908) While punning on the w ord "Blatt " as he r efers to the phenomenon of the twice-daily press, Kraus testifi es to the er adication of an unspe cifi ed forest, whose onc e-towering tr ees h ave be en, quit e lit erally, r eplaced by a t owering stack of new spapers. Kraus implies th at if silent, dignifi ed nature (Blatt as "leaf ") is going to be converted into some form of what I will call, for the moment, culture (Blatt as "page"), the product should y ield something that is somehow commensurate with what nature has provided in its more incipient form: in the case of folia ge, then, shade, protection, and sustenance. For Kraus, however, the new spaper provides the ex act opposite; it di sseminates mendacity, spreads propaganda, and as he w ill later make clear in hi s wartime writings, destroys the bonds between peoples and nations. It is then not the felling of trees that Kraus identifi es as the crime-Kraus is not a bulwark against the destruction of nature at all costs-but rather the unjustifi ed conversion of tr ees into new spapers. Th e language of these tr ees has been, for Kraus, "misquoted" by being turned into the prolix nonsense of journalese; in Benjaminian terms, the trees have been made to speak, rather than endowed with language.
Criminality can be found, for Kr aus, most oЀ en in the a cts that go unpunished by empirical bodies of la w, which is why he oЀ en att ributes to the nonlegal sphere of n ature a meta-legal, retaliatory disposition. Accordingly, Kraus continues, "Die mißhandelte Urnatur grollt; sie empört sich dagegen, daß sie die Elektrizität zum Betrieb der Dummheit geliefert haben soll. Habt ihr die Unregelmäßigkeiten der Jahreszeiten wahrgenommen? Kein Frühling kommt mehr, seitdem die Saison mit solcher Schmach erfüllt ist!" (F 261, 6) . Betrampled nature has suddenly been transformed into a force that avenges the misuse of its bount y. It fi rst rebels against the exploitation of raw energy by those w ho are incapable of usin g it for int elligent and mor al ends; then the poor qualit y of the the atrical season (Saison) violently upsets the r egularity of the n atural season (Jahreszeit). With thi s wordplay, as w ith the pun on Blatt in the fi rst quotation, Kraus insists on the inde btedness of cultur al production to the n atural world on w hich it in variably depends, an inde btedness that Kraus's language does not allow us to forget in its overlapping of semantic associations. 7 While it could only remain on the level of hypothesis to assume that Kraus truly believed that nature possessed such a v indictive sense of agency, it could be stated with certainty that in the examples above, Kraus tries to extract himself from the sc ene of the t ext and spe ak from the perspective of the n atural and quite explicitly nonhuman world. 8 Th i s voice reveals itself to be that of a "cosmic dissatisfaction":
Eine kosmische Unzufriedenheit gibt sich allenthalben kund; Sommerschnee und Wint erhitze demonstr ieren g egen den M aterialismus, der das D asein zum P rokrustesbett m acht, Kr ankheiten der Seele als Bauchweh behandelt und das A ntlitz der Natur entstellen möchte, wo immer er ihrer Züge gewahr wird: an der Natur, am Weibe, und am K ünstler [. . .]. Aber unsereins nimmt ein E rdbeben als Protest gegen die E rrungenschaЀ en des F ortschritt s ohne w eiteres hin und zw eifelt k einen Aug enblick an der M öglichkeit, dass ein Übermass menschlicher Dummheit die Elemente empören könnte. (F 261, 2-3) Irregularities in the natural world along with tectonic eruptions are described here as r eactions against a c ertain type of moder n "materialism" that makes the non-identical identical, invents remedies for melancholy and other " diseases of the soul " (here Kraus is probably referring to psychoanalysis), and "distorts" nature's countenance on those indiv iduals whom Kraus deems to be victims of an oppressive modernity. But the "elements," Kraus asserts, can only remain dormant for so long. What I suggest is that the voice of satire appears to be mimicking the r umbling and seething of these n atural elements, and it i s utt erances like these th at probably prompted Elias Canett i to write that Kraus was a "Vorläufer der Atombombe, ihre Schrecken waren schon in seinem Wort" (44). Here, rather, Kraus's voice seems to converge with the elements of nature. I will return to this point toward the end of the article. For now, I would suggest that there is a mimetic quality to the Kraus passage that resonates with what Benjamin calls the "unsinnliche Ähnlichkeiten" between language and the m aterial world (gs ii, 204-10). Kraus's language, in other words, is tr ying not simply t o describe the other ness of n ature but a ctually to imitate this very otherness in the att empt to invoke its wrathful language.
Kraus also deals, however, with the animal world, which can be seen most vividly in his treatment of a lett er composed by Rosa Luxemburg in a female prison in B reslau, a lett er Kr aus descr ibes as "dieses im deutschen S prachbereich einzig artige D okument v on Menschlichkeit und Dichtun g" ( F 546, 8, 1920) . Writt en in December 1917 and addressed to Sonia Liebknecht, this lett er expresses Luxemburg's sympathy not w ith her fel low inmates but w ith the helpless buἀ alo that were being whipped senselessly by the prison guards. While he fi nds the entirety of Luxemburg's lett er to be of inc omparable aesthetic and ethical value , Kr aus sin gles out one p articular line of w renching beauty: "Sonitschka, die Büἀ elhaut ist sprichwörtlich an Dicke und Zähigkeit, und die ward zerrissen" (F 546, 8, 1920 ). Kraus's polemic revolves around a response to the publication of this lett er in Die Fackel by an aristocrat and former subscriber who largely denounces Luxemburg as a hysterical woman who had no business int ervening in the aἀ airs of war . Luxemburg, she w rites, would have been bett er oἀ working as a " Wärterin in einem Z oologischen Garten," for her preaching of a " buἀ alo revolution" was most c ertainly falling on deaf ears. And had she only be en bett er behaved, the lett er continues, "hätt e [sie] dann gewiß keine BekanntschaЀ mit Gewehrkolben gemacht" (F 554, 6, 1920) .
Kraus be gins hi s polemical r ejoinder by defendin g the hum anity of "d[er] gute[n] Luxemburg" against the accusations brought against her and then ju xtaposes L uxemburg's hum anity a gainst both the be astliness of the prison g uards and the destr uctive ignorance, v is-à-vis botanical m att ers, of the aristocratic woman who condemns her. Kraus writes:
Zu Betrachtungen, w ie v iel ersprießlicher und er freulicher das L eben der L uxemburg v erlaufen wä re, w enn sie sich al s Wärterin in einem Zoologischen Garten betätigt hätt e sta tt als Bändigerin von Menschenbestien, v on de nen sie schließlich z erfl eischt war d, und ob sie al s Gärtnerin e dler B lumen, v on denen sie al lerdings mehr als eine Gutsbesitzerin wußte, lohnendere und befriedegendere BeschäЀ igung gefunden hätt e [. . .] w ird [. . .] kein Atemzug langen. (F 554, 9, 1920) Benjamin h as famously int erpreted the f unction of Kr ausian quota tion in juridical-theological terms: "Im rett enden und str afenden Zitat er weist die Sprache sich al s die M ater der Ger echtigkeit" (gs ii, 363). But in hi s unfi nished Passagen-Werk (1927 -1940 , he specifi es precisely how quotation would appear in a w ork that has been stripped of al l subjective judgment or c ommentary: "Diese A rbeit mu ß die K unst, ohne A nführungszeichen zu zitieren, zur höchsten Höhe entwickeln" (gs v, 572). Kraus's polemical response above, I would argue, seems to contain not only the redemptive and punitive aspects of quotation but also the unquoted aspect that Benjamin envisions in his Passagen-Werk. For in Kraus's passage, the quotation marks fall away as he poaches the words of both the estate owner as well as of Luxemburg. He fi rst "punishes" the words of the former by making them appear contemptible in their new context. Here would be an ex ample of how Kraus releases the potential of quotation to "to pierce through layers of intention, deception, and ambiguity and draw out of the fabric of language a power of judgment" (Gelley 29). B ut he then " redeems" L uxemburg's ele gant usage of the pr eterite form of werden, "ward," which she initially used in her description of the torn buἀ alo skin. Kraus thereby connects the prison guard's treatment of the buffalo to Luxemburg's own fate at the hands of the German Freikorps-just over a year aЀ er the lett er was composed-through the operative word ward. Recalling Golo Mann's remark, Kraus shows himself in thi s context to be both poacher and forest ranger.
Kraus does not, however, only come to the defense of Luxemburg. Rather th an r elegating the anim al w orld t o a s ubordinate position v is-à-vis the human one, Kraus asserts that it would never occur to a goose, "einen Innsbrucker oder eine s üdungarische G utsbesitzerin zu schelt en," for it w ould have "zu viel Takt, einen schlecht geschriebenen Brief abzuschicken, und zu viel Scham, ihn zu schreiben. Keine Gans hat eine so schlechte Feder, daß sie's vermöchte!" (F 554, 12) . Once again playing on the dual me aning of a w ord whose primary referent is a n atural object (a feather or qui ll), Kraus points immediately to its criminal abuse in the hands of the aristocrat. If the goose's feather is going to be used to make a pen, Kr aus suggests, then the pen's ink ought to be able to reproduce the feather's beauty, as Luxemburg was able to do in her missive, which, for Kraus, so accurately describes the vain suἀ ering of the animal world during a time of war. Th us, much like the trees that Kraus earlier claimed were lamentably converted into newspapers (Die Fackel, to be sure, excepted from this formulation), Kraus is not inveighing against technology tout court-that is, against the harnessing of natural resources for human ends-but a gainst any use of n ature th at cannot justi fy its sa crifi ce. Kr aus then not only quotes the deceased Luxemburg but also att empts to speak on behalf of the goose, whose true language, Kraus implies, has been understood by Luxemburg but not by the landowner, the latt er of whom treats the animal merely as a thing to be consumed: Th e goose "ist intelligent, von Natur gutmütig und mag von ihrer Besitzerin gegessen, aber nicht mit ihr verwechselt sein" (F 554, 12) . Over the course of this Fackel entry, Kraus thus transitions from direct quotation (of the estate owner) to quotation without quotation marks (of Luxemburg) and, fi nally, to w hat I w ould call indirect quotation without quotation marks (of nature).
Th e examples above link Kraus's linguistic gestures to those of a Naturanwalt, w hose task it i s to advocate on n ature's behalf by ar raigning its human inhabitants or by s uggesting that what appear to be contingent, natural disasters are actually responses to an illicit culture that has failed to establish an ethical relationship with nature. As I alluded to earlier, it would be diffi cult to map Kraus's position onto a traditional political spectrum; what I suggest, however, is that for him, crimes against nature are always committ ed-these are merely the result of human action. Th e question is whether these crimes can or cannot be justifi ed in the realm of culture, that is, whether these sacrifi ces of nature serve ethical ends.
In Die letzt en Tage der M enschheit, the N örgler claims t o h ave w ritt en a tr agedy, "deren untergehender Held die M enschheit i st; deren tr agischer Konfl ikt al s der der W elt mit der Natur tödlich endet " ( lt m, 671). During World War I, Europe's crimes have only accumulated and are now placed in more visible relief against the muted language of nature, which is given dramatic form for the fi rst time. In the penultimate scene, the Here, as in many places in the drama, the stage direction serves a crucial function, as the morning song of the birds and the evening screech of the newsboy ("Aus-ga-bee!") are immediately ju xtaposed against one another . W hile the former could be understood as the Benjaminian lament of nature, which nonetheless appears as a beautiful song to the human ear, the Nörgler laments the latt er, which intones the news of war at the beginning and end of almost every act. Kraus is generally merciless in hi s dramatic opus, but he r eserves sympathy for the voice of nature spoken from the grave, as in the case of "Der tote Wald," a character in the drama's last scene who utt ers: Th e graying of the forest is the confl ation of two distinct, though for Kraus, always related, moments: its death as the result of batt le, and its conversion into the newspaper report that distorts the news of the batt le and is thus complicit in the per petuation of the war th at makes it possi ble. Th rough this, Kraus's most literal att empt to ventriloquize nature's mourning, he shows himself to be akin to the Schillerian satirist, the "avenger of nature" to which I will later return. Th us far I h ave shown how Kraus responds to crimes he perceives have been committ ed in the m aterial world, but it i s necessary to defi ne f urther what Kraus's idea of nature entails in order to determine how this fi gure continues to serve as an a vatar for hi s satirical voice in other c ontexts. W hereas Kraus h as hither to quot ed n ature's h ypothetical r esponses t o its literal destruction, w hen tr ansposing hi s thoughts onto the a esthetic spher e he incriminates what I would call nature's literary distortions. Th at is, by appealing to the more abstract concept of natural beauty, Kraus reveals, I argue, his ideal of poetic language and thus the blueprint of his own aesthetics, even through satirical language. Kraus's quotation of nature here assumes the form of a defense of n atural beauty, and he uses hi s bête noire Heine as hi s nominal and historical point of departure.
III. From Nature to Natural Beauty
In the for ward to "Heine und die F olgen," Kr aus w rites, "Diese S chriЀ indes, so weit entfernt von dem Verdacht, gegen Heine ungerecht zu sein, w ie von dem A nspruch, i hm gerecht zu w erden, ist kein literarischer Essay. Sie erschöpЀ das P roblem H eine nicht , a ber mehr al s dieses" ( F 329, 3, 1911) . With this declaration Kraus aims to set himself apart from two literary camps prevalent in V ienna at the tur n of the c entury: the H eine admirers (whom Kraus identifi es with the liberal press) and the conservative and oЀ en openly anti-Semitic Heine detractors (à la the völkisch sentiments of Adolf Bartels).
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What Kraus suggests above, rather, is that while Heine provides the occasion for this polemic, as a historical fi gure he does not exhaust the far-reaching implications of the essay in terms of its object of critique. 10 I suggest, rather, that Heine is, for Kraus, more of an aesthetic-ideological problem than a singular historical phenomenon. Edward Timms has succinctly summarized the cultural and political stakes involved in Kraus's polemic against Heine:
Asserting that Heine's w ritings pander to the tast e of an emer gent newspaper-reading public, Kraus holds him responsible for a form of journalism, the "feuilleton," which subordinates factual reporting to a self-indulgent subjectivity. Hence the "consequences" identifi ed in "Heine und die Folgen": a journalistic civilization in which poetry is displaced by pastiche and news is swamped by opinion.
(Karl Kraus: Apocalyptic Satirist 394)
Th is is certainly true. But what I suggest is that Kraus also points to a problem in Heine's language itself, a problem that logically occurs prior to the alleged infl uence Heine has had on the state of journalism and literature during Kraus's day. Th is linguistic problem is more "Heinism" than Heine, and one cannot thus overlook the moments in the e ssay in which Kraus-in his role as literary critic-addresses Heine's failure as a ly ric poet. In this sense, it i s important not necessarily to take Kraus at his word when he writes that he did not compose a literary essay.
To return to the larger problem, how does Kraus's concept of nature undergo a shi Ѐ in signi fi cation when it i s displaced onto the a esthetic sphere? He oἀ ers a clue when he refers to Heine's poetry as the "Methode aller Poeterei, aller Feuilletonlyrik [. . .] , die ein passendes Stück Außenwelt sucht, um eine vorrätige Stimmung abzugeben" (F 349, 10, 1912) .
11 Here Kraus identi-fi es a problematic relationship between Heine the poetaster and the "exterior world" he att empts to poetize. On one level, Kraus simply denounces Heine's poetry (and the charlatans that have succeeded him) simply for being sentimental. But this charge takes on a new dimension in light of the larger question. For by accusing Heine's poetry of using the "exterior world" as mere fodder for the " mood" he w ishes to reproduce, what Kraus implies i s that in its poetic representation, the exterior world (that is, nature) is owed something that is not contained within the bounds of Heine's lyric. Heine, it seems, projects his moods onto nature and then reproduces them in his poetry as he sees fi t; for Kraus, I would argue, he humanizes nature. Kraus does not object outright to the use of n ature to somehow inspire the stuἀ of poetry, but only to the "schnöde Berufung der schon vorhandenen Welt" that is then transmitt ed to the r eader for the sole pur pose of pr oducing what Kraus calls an "eἀ ect," or Wirkung (F 349, 11) . Th e fundamental problem with Heine's lyric poetry is that it tries to mimic only the eἀ ect that nature's actual beauty has on an observer and i s thus c omposed exclusively with the reader's aἀ ective response in mind. Kraus considers this a bad form of mimesis. Heine's ly ric f urthermore fai ls be cause it i s not w hat Kr aus el sewhere calls the "naturnotwendige Verkörperung des Ge dankens" (F 261, 12, 1908 ). Heine's language, in other w ords, i s or namental in th at it c oalesces around a predetermined "thought" rather than generate the thought out of its o wn linguistic constitution (recall the semantic distinction Kraus makes between Jahreszeit and Saison in "Apocalypse"). 12 Kraus essentially sees in Heine a bad form of aestheticism, a false poet who creates rhymes arbitrarily and without concern for the ne cessary relationship between the linguistic units involved and the external referents described. In the realm of lyric poetry, Heine does not give the "nature" of his object its "necessary" due. In developing his literary aesthetics, Kraus suggests that it is the task of the poet t o create a necessary relationship between word and world, not simply one between the sounds of two words. Heine's poetry lacks this very necessity, so hi s att empts to write lyric poetry result in merely writing about nature, as if nature were a speechless and stagnant entity. In his reading of Kraus on Heine, one critic comes to a similar conclusion when he writes that Kraus "präzise erhellt [. . .] den Unterschied zwischen Lyrik, die die Dinge sprechen lässt, und solcher, die über die Dinge spricht" (Schuberth 108) , echoing Benjamin's distinction between endowing something with language and making something speak, as well as Kraus's own injunction to bring "Dinge zur Sprache" (F 287, 8, 1909) . I suggest that for Kr aus, Heine's lyric "misquotes" a c ertain component of nature's language but a di ἀ erent component from that which I h ad been describing in the fi rst section of this article. Recalling Benjamin's distinction between a humanizing and a nonhumanizing linguistic relationship to nature, it w ould se em th at for Kr aus, Heine se es in n ature only a r efl ection of hi s own limited subjectivity, which necessarily restricts the cr eative capacity of his poetic language. His lyric poetry stops, then, at the mere reproduction of a reifi ed image of nature's immediate, external beauty. As one critic comments, "Schönheit ist Kraus als vordergründiges, leicht zu r ezipierendes Ornament verdächtig" (Kranner 87) . It is what I call the language of natural beauty with which Kr aus i s her e c oncerned. To understand the ph ilosophical implications of Kraus's musings on the r elationship between nature and poetic language and why he subsequently opts for Goethe o ver Heine as his preferred lyric poet, I turn to a few key passages in Th eodor Adorno's modernist treatise Ästhetische Th eor ie.
It i s no s urprise th at Kr aus appe ars in Ador no's t ext most f requently (though not exclusiv ely) under the he ading of " natural beauty," as Ador no claims that Kraus enacted a "Hinlenkung der ästhetischen Th eorie aufs Naturschöne" (ät , 99). 13 But rather than imputing to Kraus either an antiqua ted bourgeois aesthetic sensibility à la S tefan George or a political ly suspect nature worship common among Kraus's contemporaries, 14 Adorno affi rms this particular reorientation: " Wahrgenommen w ird [das Naturschöne] ebenso als zw ingend Verbindliches w ie al s U nverständliches, das seine Au fl ösung fragend er wartet. . . . Unter seinem A spekt i st Kunst, anstatt Nachahmung der Natur, Nachahmung des Naturschönen" (ät , 111). Here Adorno posits a distinction between nature and natural beauty vis-à-vis their respective relationship to the artwork, in which natural beauty, for Adorno, fi nds its denouement. He argues that the authentic (modern) artwork does not imitate nature but rather what could be cal led its pr omise, by sho wing that "Natur, wie in ihrem Schönen zart, sterblich sich regt, noch gar nicht ist" (ät , 115, emphasis added). Th e work of ar t thus di stills the essenc e from a n ature that has not yet been realized: "'Ursprung ist das Ziel,' wenn irgend, dann für die Kunst," Adorno writes, citing Kraus while oἀ ering a reading of the latt er 's well-known aphorism (ät , 104). Origin, or Ursprung, in this context would not be a place of return but rather, more proleptically, an ideal moment that has yet to come into being: namely, I argue, the ideal of natural beauty. So concludes Adorno: "Ist die Sprache der Natur stumm, so trachtet Kunst, das Stumme zum Sprechen zu bringen" (ät , 115). 15 What I s uggest i s that for Kr aus, Heine's ly ric captures a r eifi ed image of n ature rather th an li berating its more hidden element th at hints t oward its f ulfi llment in the ide al of n atural beauty. Kraus thus tur ns to one of hi s icons, Goethe, in an a tt empt to invert the inherited cultural roles of the t wo nineteenth-century poets. 16 At a cr ucial moment in "H eine und die Folgen," Kraus writes:
Wer den L yriker a uf der S uche n ach w eltläufi gen A llegorien und beim A nknüpfen v on Beziehun gen zur Au ßenwelt zu betr eten wünscht, w ird Heine f ür den gr ößeren Lyriker h alten al s Goethe. Wer aber das Ge dicht als Oἀ enbarung des im A nschauen der N atur versunkenen Dichters und nicht der im Anschauen des Dichters versunkenen Natur begreiЀ , wird sich bescheiden, i hn als lust-und leidgeübten Techniker, als prompten Bekleider v orhandener Stimmungen zu schätzen. (F 329, 19, 1911) Kraus suggests that it is not Goethe but rather the more modern Heine whose style actually betrays an inner c onservatism, thereby under mining the wa y in which Heine was g enerally received by m any of Kr aus's contemporaries. For as a poet " immersed in n ature's intuit ion," it i s Goethe's lan guage th at refl ects that something else in nature to which Adorno refers above; Goethe, that is, honors the nature he intends to praise without resorting to the sentimental singing of its praises or to the reproduction of his own subjective dispositions. In this sense, Goethe quotes nature's otherwise mute languagethe idyllic language of natural beauty-while Heine can only quote himself. " [D] enn dort hält Natur die Stirne in die H ände," Kraus writes, referring to the gesture of the true lyric poet, "aber hier Heinrich Heine die Hand an die Wange gedrückt" (F 329, 20) . W hereas in H eine's poetr y it i s always Heine who is contemplating and hum anizing nature, in Goethe 's, nature seems to be longing aЀ er and contemplating itself. Understood in this way, Kraus hints toward a task of the lyric poet.
At the moment th at most ur gently necessitates making legible the language of what Adorno calls the ideal of natural beauty, Kraus identifi es in Heine an o verly humanized and thus di singenuous poetic r endering of n ature. As critics of modernity, Kraus and Adorno both protest, each in his own way, against the humanization of nature in ar t under the c onditions of commodity capitalism, which for them subsumes all modes of experience, artistic and otherwise, under one reifi ed gaze. 17 Adorno's conclusions refl ect more explic-itly his critique of capitalism than do Kraus's, but they nonetheless pr ecisely illuminate some of the other i ssues at stake in Kraus's critique of Heine. Adorno thus continues: "Die Würde der Natur ist die eines noch nicht S eienden, das intentionale Vermenschlichung durch seinen Ausdr uck von sich w eist" (ät , 74). Once again, Adorno employs the tr ope of the "not-yet-existing" to argue that damage is visited upon nature when its beauty is taken to be not an ideal but rather an end in itsel f. He thus speaks to the crucial diἀ erence-in my terms, between quoting and misquoting nature in the aesthetic sphere. For Kraus, the satirist and the ly ricist-both of which Heine was notare bound by their shared "pathos," which is what forges a direct link between Kraus and another one of hi s literary icons, Schiller, whom I briefl y invoked earlier (F 329, 23) . Indeed, Kraus uses an excerpt from Schiller's aesthetic treatise Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung (1795) as an epigraph to one of his own glosses, shedding signifi cant light on Kraus's conception of the relationship between satire and n ature: "Die Dicht er sind über all, schon i hrem Begriἀ e nach, die Bewahrer der Natur. Wo sie dieses nicht mehr sein können und schon in sich selbst den zerstörenden Einfl uss willkürlicher und künstli-cher Formen erfahren [. . .], da werden sie als die Zeugen und als Rächer der Natur auЀ reten" (F 44 3, 13, 1916) . 18 Kraus, it se ems, takes Schiller's description of the satirist to its logical endpoint: as nature's witness and avenger, he lashes out against what he determines to be unpardonable ecological abuses, and in his critique of Heine's lyric poetry, he detects the "licentiousness" and "artifi ciality" that preclude it from expressing or alluding to an ideal moment. Schiller (via Kraus) continues: "Satirisch ist der Dichter, wenn er die Entfernung von der Natur und den Wider spruch der Wirklichk eit mit dem I deale [. . .] zu seinem Gegenstande macht" (F 443, 13, 1916) .
Kraus invokes Schiller because he, too, identifi es the satirist and the lyricist as two sides of the same coin, united by their shared vision of an idealnot an a ctual-moment, i f ex pressed in c ontrasting ways. 19 Th e important theoretical distinction Kraus posits in hi s polemic a gainst Heine is that between two types of lyric poetry (and, to be sure, between two types of satire), only one of which discloses the promise or ideal of natural beauty. And thus in his affi nity to both Adorno's speculations on natural beauty and Schiller's refl ections on the r elationship between the satirist and the ly ric poet, Kraus reveals the germination of his own aesthetic theory, one that cannot be disentangled from his concept of nature.
IV. Th e Satirist as Natural Disaster
Shakespeare zeichnet unmenschliche Gestalten-und Timon, die unmenschlichste unter ihnen-und sagt: solch ein Geschöpf brächte Natur hervor, wenn sie das schaἀ en wollte, was der Welt, wie euresgleichen sie gestaltet hat, gebührt; was ihr gewachsen, was ihr zugewachsen wäre. So ein Geschöpf ist Timon, so eins Kraus. (gs ii, 357) 20 In the third section of his essay on Kraus, Benjamin calls the satirist a "nonhuman bein g" ( Unmensch), w ho, p aradoxically, i s al so "der Bot e eines r ealeren Humanismus" (gs ii, 366). 21 Th e diἀ erence bet ween the t wo fi gures Benjamin compares above, however, is that Timon, the misanthrope par excellence, tr uly wants t o h ave "mit Menschen nichts mehr g emein," w hereas Kraus, I would argue, simply wants nothing to do with his particular Mitmenschen. Nonetheless, Benjamin's likening of Kr aus to a n atural-or, invoking Kraus's own terminology, naturnotwendiges-phenomenon is relevant in the context of this article. Kraus, Benjamin continues, feels solidarity "nicht mit der schlanken Tanne, sondern mit dem Hobel, der sie verzehrt, nicht mit dem edlen Erz, sondern mit dem Schmelzofen, der es läutert" (gs ii, 367). By suggesting that the forces of nature actually produce the satirist as a response to the "criminal existence of men" (gs ii, 340), Benjamin insists on the absolute necessity of the sa tirical "creature," which he al so likens to a canni bal and a child, and which satirizes not because it wants to but because it must.
At several junctures in his own oeuvre, Kraus himself insists that his satire is a necessary product of the w orld's iniquities, that it is a more transparent refl ection of, and adequate response to, the aἀ airs of the da y than is the daily press, w hich, for Kr aus, has created the w orld in its o wn image. Ventriloquized through the Nörgler in Die Letzten Tage, Kraus condemns the use of technology for the sole pur pose of m anufacturing instruments of war by claiming, "Wir werden schon sehen, da ß jede Epoche die Epidemie hat, die sie verdient. Der Zeit ihre Pest!" (lt m, 122). What if satire, Kraus implicitly asks, is itself the epidemic or pestilence that every epoch deserves? Whereas Canett i earlier perceived in Kraus's "word" a precursor to the atomic bomb, here Kraus posits an implicit comparison between the plague and the natural disaster that satire i s: unforgiving in its eἀ ect, inex plicable in its ca use. Inexplicable, that is, to its v ictims, but not ne cessarily to Kraus, in w hom the seemingly inscrutable language of n ature fi nds a v essel to vent both its r age and its lament.
In this article I have tried to expand the defi nition of quotation in Kraus by suggesting that Kraus att empts to quote nature through the employ ment of var ious t echniques: mimicr y, hyperbole, w ordplay, and dir ect polemical commentary against the abuses of poetic lan guage. Rather than humanizing a wholly other nature, thereby rendering it all too intelligible, Kraus's satirical invocations of nature betray his att empt to create a certain distance between the natural and the human world, if only in an implic it att empt to overcome this distance upon the arrival of a "more real humanism. " In this form of quotation, Kraus's v iolent rhetoric oЀ en refl ects the v iolence that he per ceives is being per petrated against the n atural world: the c onversion of tr ees into insidious new spapers, the use of fe athers t o c ompose de grading mi ssives, the poaching of nature's beauty to achieve sentimentality in ly ric poetry. To paraphrase Benjamin, it i s precisely at these moments th at Kraus intervenes in his att empt to use language more as a medium to communicate a hidden language than as a me ans to a s ubjective end ( gs ii, 144-45) . If in hi s more recognizably satirical practice of quotation, Kraus renders the subjectivity of the author meaningless in his att empt to reveal a more historically grounded truth about this language without explicitly utt ering it, in the t ype of quotation I have been describing, Kraus forgoes that fi rst moment in order to grasp the subject-less language of nature and speak on its behalf. At particular moments in Kraus's oeuvre, the fi gure of nature thus constitutes the most lit erally nonhuman voice that he quot es, evincing Kraus's need to transcend the inherently false language of human subjectivity. In this way, nature serves in Kraus's work as a liminal point of critique, beyond which his voice cannot ultimately pass, despite repeated eἀ orts to assume such a privileged position in which his satirical authority could be grounded. 2. Hermann Broch, for example, wrote that the more Kraus developed his satiric technique, "desto sparsamer wurden seine Kommentare zu den Fakten; mehr und mehr genügte es ihm, unzählige kleinste Zeitungsausschnitt e bloß durch charakterisierende Betitelungen und durch die A rchitektonik ihrer Zusammenstellung wirken lassen, ein w eltenweites Gesamtbild erzeugend, aus dessen Komik die ganze Furchtbarkeit der Epoche mit ihren eigenen Worten zu sprechen beginnt" (192) .
